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ABSTRACT
The 2014-2015 West African outbreak of Ebola Virus
Disease (EVD) claimed the lives of more than 11,000
people and infected over 27,000 across seven
countries. Traditional approaches to containing EVD
proved inadequate and new approaches for controlling
the outbreak were required. The Ministry of Health &
Sanitation and King’s Sierra Leone Partnership
developed a model for Ebola Holding Units (EHUs) at
Government Hospitals in the capital city Freetown. The
EHUs isolated screened or referred suspect patients,
provided initial clinical care, undertook laboratory
testing to confirm EVD status, referred onward positive
cases to an Ebola Treatment Centre or negative cases
to the general wards, and safely stored corpses
pending collection by burial teams. Between 29th May
2014 and 19th January 2015, our five units had
isolated approximately 37% (1159) of the 3097
confirmed cases within Western Urban and Rural
district. Nosocomial transmission of EVD within the
units appears lower than previously documented at
other facilities and staff infection rates were also low.
We found that EHUs are a flexible and effective model
of rapid diagnosis, safe isolation and early initial
treatment. We also demonstrated that it is possible for
international partners and government facilities to
collaborate closely during a humanitarian crisis.
INTRODUCTION
The 2014–2015 West African outbreak of
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) was unprece-
dented in modern times, and required new
approaches for containing the outbreak and
managing the crisis. This article describes the
Ebola Holding Units (EHU) model devel-
oped by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation
and King’s Sierra Leone Partnership in
Freetown, Sierra Leone and draws out lessons
that could be usefully applied for future
Ebola outbreaks and health emergencies.
Background
The 2014–2015 West African outbreak of
EVD claimed the lives of more than 11 000
people and infected over 27 000 across seven
countries.1 One entry into the human popu-
lation is thought responsible for all cases
seen.2 Reported case fatality rates ranged
from 31% to 74% for observed cohorts.3–5
Prior to this outbreak, EVD had infected
under 2500 people in ∼30 outbreaks since its
Key questions
What is already known about this topic?
▸ Ebola Holding Units (EHUs) in government hos-
pitals in Sierra Leone played an important role in
bringing the outbreak under control.
What are the new findings?
▸ These EHUs were safe for staff and patients, and
enabled patients with Ebola virus disease to be
isolated rapidly and start treatment early.
▸ Locating isolation facilities in existing health
centres allowed non-Ebola emergency health
services to be maintained, and for new units to
be opened rapidly and with limited resources.
Recommendations for policy
▸ Government health services should lead the
response to a health crisis, and effective collab-
oration with international partners is possible.
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discovery in 1976.6 Each previous outbreak was rural,
limited to <500 cases, and controlled through standard
response interventions such as contact tracing, rapid
case identiﬁcation and isolation and infection control
measures.7 In West Africa, these traditional approaches
to containing EVD proved inadequate due to rapid
transmission across densely populated communities with
good transport infrastructure, and across national
borders.8 New approaches for controlling the outbreak
were, therefore, required.
Many different types of EVD care facilities were estab-
lished in Sierra Leone during the 2014–2015 West
African response to the EVD outbreak, each implemen-
ted differently by different partners. In Sierra Leone,
facilities could be broadly categorised into three models.
Traditional Ebola treatment centres (ETCs) were usually
large purpose-built facilities with sizeable medical and
nursing teams that undertook long-term EVD care for
conﬁrmed patients with EVD, until death or discharge.
These were often operated by international organisa-
tions with independent supply chains, and usually had a
smaller distinct area for isolation and testing of suspect
patients. EHUs were isolation units established in exist-
ing health facilities that undertook screening, testing,
and initial treatment; these were largely implemented
and staffed by local healthcare workers (HCWs), with
varying amounts of international support. Community
Care Centres were mainly established in rural areas;
these were smaller and usually standalone temporary
units that also attempted wider community engagement
and social mobilisation, again with varying degrees of
international assistance. Versions of these models were
used throughout affected countries in West Africa
during the EVD response, but with signiﬁcant varia-
tions. Therefore, when these terms are used in this
paper they refer speciﬁcally to the Sierra Leonean
context. None of these models were intended to work
in isolation. Each model was intended to work in col-
laboration with the other models, with each having a
distinct role.
The ideal response to an EVD outbreak with an expo-
nential increase in cases is ﬂexible, readily deployable,
and replicable.9 High levels of infection prevention and
control practices are needed to ensure patient and staff
safety, to reduce the risk of nosocomial infection, and
prevent health facilities acting as ampliﬁers of the out-
break.10 The response should be accessible to patients
and promote effective community engagement neces-
sary to overcome stigma and fear. It should act to help
general healthcare services reduce the high levels of
non-EVD mortality attributed to an outbreak,11 and
reduce the high levels of HCW infections.12 It should be
sustainable and ideally contribute to building more
resilient healthcare and outbreak response systems.
Resilience in a health system has been deﬁned as ‘the
capacity of health actors, institutions, and populations to
prepare for and effectively respond to crises; maintain
core functions when a crisis hits; and, informed by
lessons learned during the crisis, reorganise if condi-
tions require it.’13 Finally, it should limit EVD-associated
deaths and be suited to a low resource environment with
low ﬁnancial costs for both start-up and maintenance,
and with resilience in HCW stafﬁng.
This article describes the EHU model developed and
implemented by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation
(MOHS) and King’s Sierra Leone Partnership (KSLP)
(box 1) in Freetown, Sierra Leone, since March 2014.
We discuss the role of EHU within government hospitals
in Sierra Leone in relation to these ideal characteristics
of EVD response, the relevance of EHUs in future EVD
outbreaks, and the role of EHUs within the portfolio of
delivery platforms that are necessary to respond to EVD
outbreaks.
EHU model
The MOHS, with the support of KSLP and other inter-
national partners, established EHUs at hospitals in
Freetown in May 2014, before the country’s ﬁrst case of
EVD. The original protocols for these units were adapted
from pre-existing WHO international guidelines on
EVD.15 Initially a two-bed EHU at Connaught Hospital
was opened. Connaught Hospital played a crucial role in
transporting patients before the Western Area Ebola
Response Centre and its ambulance ﬂeet were fully estab-
lished. As the outbreak escalated in Freetown in August
2014, KSLP and MOHS increased Connaught Hospital
bed capacity to 9, then to 16 beds with two child cots,
and later opened four further units in Freetown and sup-
ported the construction of two others. Advice and clinical
support were also provided to several other centres on an
ad hoc basis. The EHUs were located within the grounds
of government hospitals, either within newly-built adja-
cent structures or repurposed existing buildings. All
Box 1 Description of King’s Sierra Leone Partnership
(KSLP)
King’s Health Partners (KHP) is one of six UK academic health
science centres. Since January 2013, KSLP has been led by KHP
in-country staff, and supported by academic, clinical and adminis-
trative staff from across KHP alongside focused short-term trips
by subject experts and international volunteers. KSLP aims to
strengthen the health system across a number of domains: clin-
ical services; health professional training and education; and
policy development that are underpinned by cross-cutting
research through its support of Connaught Hospital (the country’s
only adult referral hospital), the Ministry of Health and Sanitation
(MOHS), and the College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences.
In March 2014, KSLP was invited by MOHS to contribute to the
national Ebola Case Management Taskforce. The team built on
existing documents to help develop national hospital guidelines
for triaging patients, and developing safe isolation and testing.14
KSLP helped establish Ebola Holding Units attached to MOHS
hospitals, advised other facilities on preparedness, trained staff
and supported a command and control centre for managing case-
load in hospitals across the Western Area of Sierra Leone.
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patients were screened for EVD at the entrance and
directed as appropriate to the general wards, outpatient
clinics or the EHU. The EHUs isolated screened or
referred suspect patients, provided initial clinical care,
undertook laboratory testing to conﬁrm EVD status,
referred onward positive cases to an ETC or negative
cases to the general wards, and safely stored corpses
pending collection by burial teams (see ﬁgure 1).
There are four main goals behind the development of
EHUs situated within or adjacent to existing health facil-
ities where cases are likely to present. These are:16
1. Reduction of cases in the local community: through
rapid isolation of symptomatic and suspect EVD cases
to prevent onward transmission, with prevention of
nosocomial transmission through patient separation
and regular decontamination of surfaces and ﬂoors.
2. Improved survival of isolated patients: through provi-
sion of safe medical care, including antimalarial and
antimicrobial treatment, encouragement and assistance
to eat and drink, regular assessment of hydration and
clinical status, and symptomatic pain and sickness relief.
3. Maintenance of general non-EVD healthcare:
through prompt diagnosis of EVD and onward trans-
fer of patients to dedicated ETCs, alongside the
exclusion of EVD and triage of negative patients into
outpatient or inpatient facilities for general care. This
allows for the essential continuation of paediatric vac-
cination, maternal and child health, HIV and tubercu-
losis programmes and general medical and emergency
surgical care within the hospitals. This is only possible
through screening at point of entry into the
healthcare facility to reduce the risk of EVD introduc-
tion into the outpatient or ward environment.
4. Reduction in healthcare worker infections: through
staff training inside the EHU, and infection preven-
tion and control strengthening on general wards.
This is not only an important goal in its own right
but is also essential for avoiding closure of facilities,
and thereby achieving goal three given above.
The MOHS had overall strategic leadership of the
EHUs at all times and took responsibility for: making
buildings or space available for the facility; posting local
health workers and cleaning staff; paying hazard pay and
staff salaries; providing personal protective equipment
and medical supplies; and ensuring that support func-
tions, including ambulances, laboratory transport and
testing, and burial teams, were available.
KSLP (with the support of other organisations, such as
the international non-governmental organisation GOAL
for construction) worked with local colleagues to: design
and construct the facility; train local staff on safety and
patient care; develop local clinical pathways; oversee clin-
ical care and troubleshoot problems or difﬁcult cases;
develop administrative systems such as stock systems and
patient records; provide additional manpower (particu-
larly at the physician level) and role-modelling; and
provide additional medical supplies, where items were
not available or in short supply through the government
supply chain.
There were regular assessments of safety, efﬁciency
and quality of care conducted jointly by the MOHS,
KSLP and independent specialist agencies such as the
Figure 1 Simplified patient flow within an Ebola Holding Unit (EHU). DSOs, disease surveillance officers.
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WHO and US Centres for Disease Prevention and
Control (CDC). All sites were regularly assessed by KSLP
over three domains: infection prevention and control;
clinical care; and operational performance.
Integration within the wider Ebola response was essen-
tial and the Government of Sierra Leone, with the
support of KSLP and other agencies, established a
Western Area Ebola Response Centre on 8 September
2014 that, among other activities, directed case manage-
ment ﬂow. This coordinated the transfer of suspect cases
from the community and from facilities already at cap-
acity into EHUs, communicated laboratory results with
facilities, synchronised transfers of conﬁrmed patients
with EVD to treatment centres or burial teams, and
informed relevant surveillance networks. It also allowed
for early warning of potential problems at peripheral
EHU sites.
Outcomes
Between 29 May 2014 and 19 January 2015, our ﬁve
EHUs had isolated ∼37% (1159) of the 3097 conﬁrmed
cases within Western Urban and Rural districts17 before
transfer to dedicated ETCs for onward management.
Figure 2 highlights the construction of these EHUs at a
time when cases were exponentially increasing in Sierra
Leone, particularly in the Western Area, from early July
2014; ﬁgure 3 shows their physical location. On average,
nearly half (45%) of all isolated suspects were
EVD-positive, with limited discriminatory features seen
in cases.18 A further 1412 patients were tested, and
either discharged or entered the general medical system
for onward care. Nosocomial transmission of EVD within
the EHUs appears to be lower than that previously docu-
mented at other facilities during the outbreak,19 with a
positive readmission rate of 1–3% across all units
(Ministry of Health and Sanitation and King’s Sierra
Leone Partnership—unpublished operational data). All
eight staff infections were fully investigated by the CDC
HCW infection team—one was attributed to a break in
personal protective equipment (PPE) on opening a
medication vial, one to inadequate decontamination,
two due to provision of medical care outside of the
EHU, and the others thought to be associated with com-
munity transmission outside of their role in the hospital.
Total construction costs of all sites was <$50 000 for 79
beds. Start-up times were rapid, with average lead times
of 1 week for units to become operational (see table 1).
Stafﬁng was in the main performed by local HCWs and
cleaners, though Connaught Hospital, the principle
adult referral hospital in the country, received more
support in terms of international stafﬁng and oper-
ational input than the other units. These were largely
supervised by one or two international staff who regu-
larly visited and maintained telephone communication
with the site supervisors.15
DISCUSSION
Our experience demonstrated that EHUs can be a safe
and effective model of care that has a number of key
strengths. By co-locating EHUs in existing medical facil-
ities, these were able to detect new chains of transmis-
sion by screening walk-in patients who had a
non-speciﬁc febrile illness and were seeking general
health services. Screening and early isolation of these
patients protected both HCWs and patients without
EVD from nosocomial transmission on the general
wards. This enabled the health facilities to remain open
Figure 2 Ebola Holding Unit (EHU) Bed Capacity in the Western Area Urban and Rural Districts (hospital, date opened, total
bed numbers—red line KSLP-supported MOHS sites, blue line—other MOHS and NGO sites) mapped against total number of
suspect cases in Sierra Leone. KSLP, KSLP, King’s Sierra Leone Partnership; MOHS, Ministry of Health and Sanitation.
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for non-EVD emergency care for the duration of the
protracted outbreak, whereas many other health facil-
ities without EHUs had to be closed down. For example,
before the construction of the EHU at Rokupa
Government Hospital, the hospital had 11 HCW infec-
tions in 3 weeks. After construction of the EHU at this
hospital, there were none.
Suspected patients who tested negative for EVD but
had another serious illness (such as appendicitis or life-
threatening complications of HIV) could immediately
access further inpatient or outpatient care within the
same facility. Our experience was that the EHUs were
safe for staff and patients, provided reliable diagnoses
and initiated early bundles of care covering a variety of
likely pathologies (P Arkel, D Youkee, CS Brown, et al.
Quantifying the risk of nosocomial infection within
Ebola Holding Units: a retrospective cohort study of
negative patients discharged from ﬁve Ebola Holding
Units in Western Area, Sierra Leone. Paper submitted to
Tropical Medicine & International Health; March 2016).
The EHU model has system-wide beneﬁts. Using exist-
ing facilities meant that EHUs could be deployed early
in the outbreak, and rapidly constructed.20 Start-up
times were rapid due to the beneﬁts of utilising existing
logistics, waste management facilities and stafﬁng sche-
dules. It was much less expensive to adapt existing struc-
tures than to build new sites. Together these reduced
resourcing requirements, such as capital expenditure or
international or national health workers, which freed up
resources to be deployed elsewhere. The use of existing
supply chain and other government systems reduced the
need for parallel structures that were expensive and
challenging to establish, and risked undermining local
long-term systems. Leadership of the EHUs by the
MOHS and local HCWs could be maintained, thereby
building up local institutional capacity and helping to
ensure local ownership and community acceptance.
Integration within the MOHS allows the EHUs to coord-
inate effectively with other aspects of outbreak response,
thus strengthening the health system alongside the EVD
response.
EHUs also demonstrated ﬂexibility and could be
adapted as the epidemic grew and receded. In EVD
endemic countries, such as Uganda and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, sporadic re-emergence is an
ongoing concern. Capacity must remain to isolate, test
and treat EVD: this must be responsive, scalable and
adaptive to local epidemiology. The EHU model works
well within a resilience framework.13 These can be
diverse; in Freetown, they were located at primary and
secondary care facilities as well as specialist centres for
obstetrics, paediatrics and psychiatry. They can be multi-
functional and adaptive, allowing for the isolation and
screening of other potential outbreaks such as cholera,
Marburg or Lassa fever; it might not be feasible to
manage diseases transmitted through the airborne
route, such as Middle East Respiratory syndrome
(MERS), as different infection control methods are
required. They can easily be reactivated to enable EVD
care with trained, on-site staff if and when the need
Figure 3 KSLP-supported MOHS Ebola Holding Units (EHUs). KSLP, King’s Sierra Leone Partnership.
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should arise. The hub and spoke model, using
Connaught as a base, allowed for resilience and staff
support and training from a central site.
Our experience also showed that the EHU model has
important limitations. The EHUs usually only provided
isolation, diagnosis, and early treatment but then had to
refer conﬁrmed cases to ETUs for further care. Where
no ETU beds were available, patients sometimes had to
travel for up to 6 hours by ambulance to remote ETU
facilities, which most likely had a detrimental impact on
their outcomes. The medical care available to patients,
while meeting national and international standards, was
relatively limited; the EHUs did not have the capacity to
provide all patients with intravenous ﬂuids or have
access to novel therapeutics that were being trialled.
These challenges were not unique to EHUs, but there
were some factors about this model that made certain
procedures more difﬁcult or risky for staff: utilising exist-
ing buildings limited the ability to optimise layout and
infection control processes; and EHUs operated with
much lower stafﬁng numbers compared to other types
of facility, as well as relying largely on government
health workers who were often less well paid or highly
qualiﬁed than international counterparts. Higher staff to
patient ratios and more senior supervision for staff
would enable higher standards of care to be provided,
and indeed this was achieved at some EHUs later in the
outbreak.
The EHUs were most useful in an urban setting,
where there was easy direct patient access to a secondary
or tertiary care facility: they were able to pick up and
detect new cases that presented to hospital in a setting
where contact tracing was very challenging; they could
utilise existing buildings in areas where there was little
or no open ground for tented facilities; and could be
established early in an outbreak and be kept open for
long periods with minimal resources, which was import-
ant as new chains of transmission can rapidly be brought
into urban hubs from rural areas with little notice.
While EHUs are still relevant for hospitals in rural areas,
community-based models of care may have a more sig-
niﬁcant role in this context. The function of EHUs was
largely restricted to medical interventions, with limited
involvement in community sensitisation or contact
tracing. The use of pre-existing infrastructure sometimes
meant that optimal layout was difﬁcult to achieve and
compromise was often necessary, such as having to
locate incinerators or screening points at sites distant
from the isolation beds. However, sites did often have
appropriate physical locations, for example by being
adjacent to entrances, for ease of entry into the EHU
from screening areas.
The use of existing systems, such as medical supply
chain and risk allowance, had beneﬁts; however, this
could also add pressure to an overstretched system and
create challenges. Managing this required effective col-
laboration with government partners, ﬂexibility (eg,
switching to different types of PPE, when necessary),T
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and proactive troubleshooting when problems arose.
Ultimately this worked well but we were unable to elim-
inate the need for parallel systems completely; for
example, we needed a supplementary supply chain for
some items, and there were still challenges. These
included staff strikes due to lack of hazard pay. Similarly,
the partnership approach involved more stakeholders
(local hospital, supporting partner, MOHS, donor) and
this could make decision-making slower and more chal-
lenging. Managing this required trust, good communica-
tion, mutual empathy and strong, and sustained
leadership from all sides.
Overall we believe the EHU model achieved the four
goals set out in the introduction above, although given
the chaotic, multidimensional and rapidly evolving
nature of the outbreak and the lack of good data it is dif-
ﬁcult to prove this or unequivocally show a causal rela-
tionship. The EHUs will have signiﬁcantly reduced the
number of cases in the community, given that 1159 EVD
cases were isolated in EHUs from the community in the
Western Area at a time when no other isolation beds
were available.21 The nosocomial transmission rates in
EHUs have been shown to be extremely low and were
certainly lower than would have been achieved in a
general hospital setting. We believe that EHUs in Sierra
Leone made an important contribution to reducing
EVD transmission. There is no data on survival rates of
patients with EVD who were isolated in EHUs compared
to those remaining in the community or presenting to
other forms of facility; however, since all suspected
patients were immediately started on treatments (such as
oral rehydration and antibiotics) that are known to
reduce EVD mortality, and since these were largely
unavailable in the community and there were no avail-
able beds elsewhere, we can infer that EHUs reduced
mortality for patients with EVD. Some, but not all,
general health services were maintained in hospitals
with EHUs; the Connaught Hospital Emergency
Department remained open and general medicine
wards remained largely at capacity during the outbreak,
although other services were signiﬁcantly reduced, such
as elective surgeries which were reduced by 97%. The
extent to which general health services were maintained
varied between departments and across different hospi-
tals, and varied over time. However, hospitals with EHUs
were more likely to remain open. For instance, the Ola
during Children’s Hospital (the equivalent paediatric
hospital to Connaught Hospital in Freetown) closed
completely for 2 months from September to November
2014 until an EHU was established and the hospital was
reopened. There were similar closures of hospitals in
Monrovia, Liberia. The reduction of health worker mor-
tality is a complex issue: many hospitals without an
effective EHU saw high levels of health worker infections
and these infections reduced signiﬁcantly when an EHU
was opened (as demonstrated above at Rokupa
Hospital). However, the health worker infection rate was
not eliminated completely in hospitals with an EHU;
since it is likely that the hospitals would have closed
without an EHU and staff would have remained at
home, it could be argued that EHUs kept staff at risk.
However, many health worker infections occurred when
health workers provided informal care in the community
(which would likely have increased if hospitals had
closed) and without EHUs, the overall scale of the out-
break would likely have been greater (putting everyone
in the community, including health workers, at
increased risk). We believe that our data supports the
claim that EHUs largely achieved their goals.
We learned a number of important lessons from our
involvement in the response to the Ebola outbreak in
Sierra Leone. An effective and resilient health system is
the cornerstone of any response to a health crisis and it
is essential to invest in getting the basics right when
times are good, before the emergency. We were too slow
to challenge some of the conventional wisdom from pre-
vious outbreaks, particularly the belief that EVD would
not cause major urban outbreaks. The Government of
Sierra Leone and its partners ultimately did shift into
emergency mode, but we could have moved from a
‘development’ mindset to a ‘humanitarian’ one more
quickly, spending greater resources more rapidly, redu-
cing bureaucracy, suspending non-critical activities and
adopting a different relationship and form of communi-
cation with partners. We demonstrated that government
services, including the public health system, are not only
capable of playing a safe and central role in a health
crisis and humanitarian emergency but are the fastest
and most efﬁcient way of doing so. We believe that sup-
porting government health facilities as the primary
responders to a crisis should be the starting place of any
international relief efforts through close collaboration.
Crises often become protracted and are likely to recur
in future. However, funding for any response soon starts
to dry up once the height of the emergency is over; it is,
therefore, advisable to plan for the long term even from
the beginning, such as building permanent facilities or
training local health workers. Finally, good command
and control can enable a far more effective use of exist-
ing resources. For example, maximising the use of exist-
ing bed capacity is more effective than building more
beds, but this requires up-to-date operational data and
clear protocols for decision-making.
CONCLUSION
We found that in Sierra Leone, EHUs were a ﬂexible
and effective model of care to achieve rapid diagnosis,
safe isolation, and early initial treatment before referral
of conﬁrmed patients with EVD to ETCs. We also
demonstrated that it is possible for international part-
ners and government facilities to collaborate closely
during a humanitarian crisis. We believe our experience
is a successful example of how outbreak response can be
integrated into pre-existing health systems, and how the
government and international partners can collaborate
in an integrated fashion. This approach had the
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advantages of being quick to establish, of providing long-
term resilience for managing future outbreaks, and for
building broader capacity in the health sector.
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